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Napoleon Bonaparte: From Corsica to Russia 
Nicholas Lock
The Moscow campaign, June 1812 -  December 1812, was the finale in what had 
been one o f the most extraordinary military careers in history. Napoleon had astonished 
the world by his record o f military successes ever since setting foot on the battlefield. In 
his battles he proved to be an unstoppable force and he conquered his enemies in rapid 
succession. By 1805, this young, short Corsican had become the greatest hero to France 
and by the age o f 35 he became Emperor. The mere name o f Napoleon was sufficient to 
strike terror in the hearts o f men and women throughout Europe. Armies retired 
from the battlefield upon hearing that Napoleon would be leading the fight against them. 
This proved that Napoleon was more than a man, he was a reputation. This reputation 
lasts even today. “Being neutral about Napoleon has never been easy for Europeans. To 
the French he is almost universally a national hero, his excesses overlooked and 
unmentioned. By most other Europeans, whose ancestors suffered terribly under his 
conquests, he is, understandably, hated” (Schom xix). How an obscure man, from a 
provincial garrison town outside o f France, became the greatest military figure since Julius 
Caesar is a question that has occupied the minds of historians ever since. In this essay we 
will consider how aspects o f his personality and background foreshadowed the career 
Napoleon would have as well as his failure and, ultimately his defeat, in Russia.
Napoleon was bom to Letizia and Carlo Maria di Buonaparte on August 15, 1769. 
Little did they know that their son would someday rule an empire. Yet we can find many 
hints in Napoleon’s personality as a youth that made his rise to power no surprise. “The 
four-square self-sufficiency characteristic o f the old Roman nature appears early in the 
nature o f Napoleon Bonaparte” (Rose 16). He had a short childhood and soon was on his 
own. On December 17, 1778, Napoleon left Corsica for France where he attended the 
Royal Military School o f Brienne-le-Chateau. Here he learned the French language, 
history, geography, mathematics, and other subjects, which prepared him for the Ecole 
Militaire o f Paris. He was exceedingly good at geography and mathematics. He rarely left 
military school and studied often and hard. Aside from his comprehensive study of 
various subjects, which showed his strong desire to absorb as much knowledge as 
possible, Napoleon also gained strength against the taunting and bullying of the other 
school boys. “His diminutive stature, his very limited French, distorted by a strong 
Corsican accent, his arrogance and continual chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, and his anger 
against France as the occupier of his beloved country set him off from the others" (Schom 
4). He would often shout to the French schoolboys, “I’ll make you French pay, one day!” 
(Schom 5). Napoleon was as strong minded with his schoolmasters as he was with his 
schoolmates. “On one occasion he was disciplined by a master for disobedience and 
ordered to replace his uniform with rough clothing and then to eat dinner kneeling on the 
floor o f the refectory with 109 smirking school boys looking on. Napoleon rebelled. ‘I’ll 
eat standing up, Monsieur, and not on my knees.... In my family we kneel only before 
God!” (Schom 5). His authoritative display o f arrogant behavior was apparent at this 
early age. One thing is for sure, Napoleon had always been accustomed to the odds being 
against him. Napoleon never backed down and his future successes and his ultimate 
failure were a byproduct o f this attitude.
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Napoleon entered the Ecole Militaire in Paris on October 19, 1784. There he 
began to teach German, physics, the construction of fortifications, drawing, public law, 
and philosophy, as well as more advanced levels o f  subjects previously studied. 
Mathematics, fortifications, and artillery proved to be his favorites and he received his 
commission in the army artillery on September 28, 1785 (Schom 6-7). From here 
Napoleon began a quick ascension up the military ranks. His personality and study habits 
were noticed by many high ranking officers and his reputation quickly began to build 
strength.
Napoleon’s quick wit and personality aided him in his mischievous and 
underhanded military tactics. Rose accounts Napoleon’s method of dealing with the 
conflict o f France and Spain: “I find far more of impetuosity than trickery. True, there 
were many occasions when he resorted to falsehood and deception. His policy towards 
the Spanish dynasty in the spring o f 1808 is an example of insidious intrigue worthy of the 
Medici o f Florence...” (36). Indeed, Napoleon was capable o f bending the rules at times. 
He was not ashamed o f these deeds, however, and he was dedicated to win at any and all 
costs. Although he was aware o f his leadership skills and tactical mind, he always took 
care of his men. “... he was an ideal leader. To his generals he for the most part turned 
the colder side o f his nature, exacting instant and unquestioning obedience, giving them 
abundant opportunities to enrich themselves at the expense o f the liberated peoples, and 
finally dowering them with immense domains...” (Rose 84). He made his soldiers tremble 
at the sound o f his very voice. He was arrogant and expected his troops to follow his 
every order. On one occasion, Napoleon shouted, “Death is nothing; but to live 
vanquished and without glory is to die every day” (Rose 85). Words such as these also 
give us insight into Napoleon’s brilliant and eloquently spoken speeches. His words had 
the ability to stir his great armies into action. His men would follow him anywhere. In the 
end, they followed him into his greatest failure.
The previous portion o f this paper has dealt with Napoleon’s intelligence, his 
incredible drive to be the best, his arrogance, and his stubbornness. These personal 
characteristics aided Napoleon in his drive to become the emperor o f France. However, 
as the remainder o f this paper will show these are the qualities that also led to his 
downfall. If  the seeds o f Napoleon’s downfall were sown as early as the winter o f  1806, 
the speed of his decline was indubitably hastened by the catastrophic Campaign of 1812. 
Time was to show that the decision to invade Russia constituted the irrevocable step, 
which effectively compromised any remaining chance o f survival for Napoleon and his 
Empire (Chandler 739).
In 1807, Napoleon and Tsar Alexander had created a friendship at Tilsit. They 
created an alliance, but by the end o f 1810 the two empires began to develop hostilities 
towards each other. “Basically it was insatiable ambition, lust for power and a desire to 
regain the international position he had enjoyed in July 1807 that led Napoleon to make his 
fatal decision” (Chandler 740). The Tsar o f Russia had attempted to create a “friendly 
accommodation” for Napoleon in favor o f France. With these appeasements made, 
Napoleon seemed to be the “master o f continental Europe.” Over time, however, Tsar 
Alexander’s opinions concerning his arrangement with Napoleon began to change. His 
fascination with the man had worn off and he started to hear more clearly his country’s 
complaints. Napoleon continued to make many attempts to uphold a friendship with
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Russia. He encouraged them to lead conquests into the neighboring countries of Finland, 
Turkey, and Persia (Chandler 740). Unfortunately, “The interests o f Russia and France 
clashed at so many points that there was little prospect o f lasting peace” (Palmer 24-25). 
The conflict between the two nations were due primarily for three reasons. Chandler 
describes these three issues, the first o f which concerns the possession o f land.
“Alexander desired nothing so much as possession of Constantinople and the Balkan states 
known as ‘the Principalities,’ but these particular ambitions Napoleon was equally 
determined to thwart, having no desire to allow Russian influence into the Mediterranean 
sphere” (740). Secondly, Napoleon’s presence in Poland was seen as directly trespassing 
into Russian territory and national interests. Finally, Russia’s involvement in the alliance 
with France and the Continental System was costly and placed a financial strain on Russia, 
as well as putting a halt to the country’s once lucrative trade in timber and natural stores 
with Great Britain. This “... led to grave unrest among the nobility and merchants who 
found their wealth threatened as the rouble rapidly devalued” (742).
In 1811, as tensions increased between France and Russia, Alexander thought 
about launching a preventive war against France. He decided that they did not have 
adequate means or supplies for a war. Instead, he decided to launch a defensive strategy. 
Alexander stated in a letter: “I intend to follow the system which has made Wellington 
victorious in Spain and exhausted the French armies -  avoid pitched battles and organize 
long lines of communication for retreat, leading to entrenched camps” (Palmer 26-27).
The Tsar realized that the strength of Russia lied in the size o f  his country rather than in 
his country's military might. Meanwhile, Napoleon was dealing with an economic crisis in 
France as well as unemployment in Paris. There was also the problem o f the country’s 
conflict with Spain. “That spring, however, he began to move more and more troops into 
Germany and he took every opportunity o f emphasizing his military preparedness to the 
Russian diplomats in Paris.” He told his ambassador in St. Petersburg, Caulaincourt, who 
warned Napoleon of happenings in Russia, “Puh! One good battle will see the end of all 
your friend Alexander’s fine resolutions -  and his castles o f sand as well!” (Palmer 27). 
Here we see Napoleon’s arrogance regarding the developing tensions with Russia. “The 
general confidence in Napoleon’s coming victory had an apparently sound basis. Russia 
was being invaded by the manifold regiments o f  a superbly organized army, headed by a 
military genius long regarded as a captain greater than Alexander the Great, Hannibal, 
Julius Caesar, or Frederick II, and who, even before 1812, had won far more victories, 
major and minor, than all these generals o f the past” (Tarle 262).
This event also gives us an idea of how organized Napoleon was. “A sign o f a 
strong nature is the resolve to master every fact that is essential to success. Where a weak 
or nervous man pretends that he knows, the strong and able man will make sure that he 
knows” (Rose 89). On August 16, 1811, Napoleon began planning a campaign in Russia. 
In December he had started his meticulous study common to all o f  his campaigns. “On 
December 19 his librarian was requested to send him ‘good books with the best 
information about Russian topography, and especially Lithuania, dealing with marshes, 
rivers, woods, roads, etc’ and also ‘the most detailed account in French o f the campaign of 
Charles XII [of Sweden] in Poland and Russia’” (Palmer 28). Rose states that Napoleon 
was well equipped for the struggle of life. Napoleon was extremely thorough with 
regard to his military tactical style. In essence, his success depended upon his ability to
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rationalize the military situation at hand and then proceed to implement it on the 
battlefield. (43).
Although attempts were made to defuse a potential conflict, Russia continued 
to insist that she be permitted to trade freely with other countries and that France 
withdraw her troops from Prussia. Napoleon decided that he would invade Russia in June 
of 1812, and on May 9 o f that year he set out on his journey. Throughout the campaign, 
the Russians continued to use their strategy of retreat to avoid battle. One instance 
involved France entering Smolensk. They fought a small battle between 10:00 am and 
6:00 pm on August 17, 1812. “When darkness came, Napoleon continued the 
bombardment o f the city. Suddenly -  in the middle o f  the night -  one terrific explosion 
after another shook the earth. A fire broke out, spreading across the entire city. The 
Russians were exploding their stores o f gunpowder and burning Smolensk.... At 
daybreak, the French scouts reported that the town had been evacuated by the troops...” 
(Tarle 270). Napoleon entered the city with a somber manner. He had an incredible 
ability to maintain his temper. Another example of this is seen with the French army’s 
march on Vilna.
In his attempt to surprise the Russian rearguard in Vilna, he ordered the famous 
cavalry general, Montbrun, to push on with his corps and seize the magazines. Etiquette 
required that the order should come from Murat, commander-in-chief o f the cavalry. “He 
[Murat], therefore, on seeing Montbrun’s advance, angrily bade him retire, and... lost the 
prize at Vilna. Napoleon, rightly indignant at Montbrun’s retirement, vehemently 
reproached him in presence of Murat.... At last, unable to endure Napoleon’s reprimand, 
Montbrun drew his sword, whirled it high in the air, and galloped off, exclaiming, ‘You 
may go to the devil, all of you.’ Napoleon remained speechless with rage... turned his 
horse and rode away, issuing no order for Montbrun’s arrest.” On the way back Murat 
explained the incident, and neither Murat nor Montbrun incurred a further reprimand 
(Rose 40). Yet, Napoleon never allowed his anger to overtake his ability to 
command his men successfully. Therefore, Napoleon always tried to “compose” 
himself in every situation and adopted a very charming disposition.
“After Smolensk, Napoleon no longer hoped to gain a complete and crushing 
victory over Russia” (Tarld 270). He was becoming aware that the war was heading 
towards a bad end. He had entered the burning Smolensk quietly and morosely. There 
was no battle and he knew he had to press further east towards Moscow. His morale 
began to decline: “It was not only that his army had diminished by half, in consequence of 
the necessity of maintaining the tremendous communications line, o f garrisoning the 
provision and munition stores, o f having to engage in petty yet stubborn and sanguinary 
skirmishes, of having to contend with the terrible heat, exhaustion and disease.... It was 
that the Russian soldiers fought not a whit less bravely than at Eylau. Even apart from 
Bagration, the Russian generals were by no means as incompetent as he had been inclined 
to believe...” (Tarle 271). Napoleon usually had a talent forjudging people’s abilities and 
he recognized the methods the Russian army was utilizing as being very difficult and 
worthy o f praise.
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Napoleon’s arrogance left him unsatisfied with any victory not achieved through 
him exhibiting his skills in battle. This is the main flaw which inevitably led to his defeat. 
“After Smolensk... Napoleon’s main objective was to enter Moscow, and from there to 
offer peace to Alexander. But no matter how he thirsted for Moscow, he had no desire to 
possess the city without a battle” (Tarle 276). Napoleon became excited as he neared 
Moscow. He could finally give his troops a chance to rest and he thought he could use the 
city as a hostage to force Alexander into an agreement. He soon discovered that the 
residents of Moscow had evacuated. Mysteriously, flames began to appear in scattered 
areas through the city. The next morning, the flames grew and a strong wind enveloped 
the city and spread the fires. “When the first fires were reported to him, Napoleon did not 
show any great concern, but when on the morning of the 17Ih he made a tour of the 
Kremlin and from the windows of the place saw the raging ocean of fire sweeping in every 
direction, he grew pale and, contemplating the conflagration, in silence said at last: ‘What 
a dreadful sight! And they started it themselves...’” (Tarle 283). Indeed, Napoleon had 
no doubt in his mind concerning the origins o f the flames. Russia, rather than give in to 
Napoleon’s desires, had burnt down another one of their cities.
The situation in Moscow saw a change come over Napoleon’s personality. He 
could no longer control his temper and “He was at times a raging madman” (Tarle 284). 
He still continued to rule France from Moscow. He did not, however, feel France was 
stable enough for him to remain in Moscow for the winter. Napoleon did not trust his 
allies to maintain his empire; likewise, his supply line was insufficient to carry out 
the remaining winter campaign. His communication line was also becoming weaker. 
Although attempts were made to communicate with Alexander, the Tsar continually failed 
to reply. Whereas, previously, Napoleon patiently listened to the ideas o f others without 
bias towards his own, now he no longer heard out his men without losing patience. His 
arrogance kept him from making his decision to retreat from Moscow. Finally, he decided 
to leave the city. The journey home was a disaster. “The weather grew colder and colder. 
The Cossacks and the Russian militia... raided the French provision train and captured all 
manner o f foodstuffs and ammunition. Gradually Napoleon’s army became weaker and 
more dispirited” (Tarle 296). Napoleon’s campaign of Russia finally came to an end in 
December o f 1812. He had set off on the campaign with over 400,000 men and returned 
with only around 10,000 (Rubarth-Lay -  see included chart).
Napoleon was a conqueror. He was perhaps the greatest and most feared force in 
Europe during his time. His reputation outlasts him even today. “Above all, there burnt in 
him the flame o f genius. It defies analysis; it baffles description; but generals and troops 
felt the spell. Civilians who sought to control the young warrior found themselves in the 
meshes of an all-controlling will” (Rose 44). He lived a life devoted to the military and to 
France. He worked his way from a small, Corsican boy teased in military school, to a 
force to be reckoned with by all o f Europe. “ ... we may assert that, able though Napoleon 
was in the Cabinet and on the battlefield, he was far more than an astute diplomatist, a 
discerning lawgiver, a triumphant warrior, a great Emperor. He was greatest o f all as 
man” (Rose 44). Though Napoleon’s defeat in Russia set off the idea that he could be 
defeated; and eventually led to his overall failure, his name will live on forever in history. 
Many historians, worldwide, will continue to devote their lives to the study of his reign 
and books upon books will be dedicated to his name. One may be tempted to view this
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fascination with the man as his final success. He yearned to be respected and known all 
over the world in his time. Though after his death, Napoleon achieved this objective. In 
essence, he conquered his last front.
Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 1812
Being an illustrated account o f the ill-fated expedition o f the Emperor Napoleon’s Grand
The map, based on the 1869 chart by Minard, graphically illustrates (both literally and 
figuratively) how the size o f  the French army dwindled during the march into Russia and 
was reduced to almost nothing on the wretched rout back into Poland. The map can be 
read in several ways. The size o f the peach colored bar indicates the relative strength of 
the French army during the march on Moscow. The black bar shows the dwindling French 
army during the retreat. In the lower portion o f the map, the temperature in degrees 
Celsius is shown, along with dates during the retreat.
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